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I. Introduction 
 
Refugees and asylum seekers are vulnerable persons per se—they are forced to flee their home, are left 
without their familiar sources of support, and then face several obstacles concerning their asylum claims. 
However, among those seeking asylum, there are those more exposed to increased risks of harm and thus 
require special protection. These include survivors of torture, sexual or gender-based violence or other 
harm. 
 
At the national level, when filing an asylum case, women asylum seekers face cultural barriers, such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder and psychological difficulties, like the deeply ingrained idea of shame, which 
prohibit them from providing decisionmakers with the personal narratives of the harms they have 
experienced in their countries of origin. Women asylum seekers are often averse to divulging to their male 
family members, certain harms they have suffered from, including rape.1 Such specific state of vulnerability 
is singled out by the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women 
and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) which specifically highlights women asylum seekers as being 
at an increased risk of gender-based violence.2 
 
At the international level, on the other hand, as this paper would demonstrate, the decisions of international 
human rights treaty bodies reflect a tendency towards disbelief in terms of the gravity of women’s pain and 
suffering and towards viewing women within the context of their roles within the family. Because of this bias 
against women complainants, mostly those seeking asylum in a country other than their country of origin, 
it becomes even more difficult for them to counter this narrative. This is despite the adjudicators’ awareness 
that returning women asylum countries to their countries of origin is tantamount “to having told a Jew in the 
1930s to return to Germany and accept his or her legal discrimination.”3 
                                                 
1 Aubra Fletcher, ‘The REAL ID Act: Furthering Gender Bias in U.S. Asylum Law’ (2006) 21 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 114. 
2 Council of Europe, ‘The Convention in Brief’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/the-convention-in-
brief#{%2211642301%22:[1]}> accessed 20 September 2019. 
3 See Mary Williams Walsh, ‘Battered Women as Refugees: Female Asylum-Seekers in Canada Say They're Being Persecuted in 
their Homelands on the Basis of their Sex. Should Balkan Rape Victims and Feminists in Islamic States Qualify as Political Refugees?’ 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1993) < https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-02-23-mn-448-story.html> accessed 20 September 
2019. This story involved a Saudi Arabian woman who refused to wear a veil and wanted to pursue a university degree. The male 
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This paper examines the extent to which the two primary international treaty bodies mainly concerned with 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—the Committee Against Torture 
(CAT) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) acknowledge the vulnerabilities of women asylum seekers. 
I do this by conducting a feminist analysis of how the HRC and the CAT have adjudicated the claims of 
women asylum seekers based on the Committees’ mandate over Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)4 and Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT)5 
respectively. Throughout the paper, decisions of the HRC and the CAT on cases filed by women asylum 
seekers6 were selected because of their reasoning, mostly because of the bias against women the cases 
illustrate. 
 
Analysis of the ‘views’ or decisions made by the HRC and the CAT reveals that these treaty bodies are 
gender-biased because they fail to consider women as individual human beings with independent rights 
and interests. Based on an in-depth analysis of selected decisions involving the principle of non-
refoulement, the HRC and the CAT have failed to fully capture the human rights violations experienced by 
women asylum seekers. In doing so, they have rendered the claims of women asylum seekers invisible in 
various ways—(1) by jointly adjudicating women’s claims with their spouses’ claims (2) by overly relying on 
the women’s family support network (3) by misunderstanding women’s different threshold of harm.  
 
Indeed, most cases involving violence against women do not reach the treaty bodies,  and thus, may have 
limited direct impact in providing remedies to human rights violations against women.7 However, because 
of their persuasive authority, there is still much to be gained in closely analyzing the cases and in attempting 
to uncover the gender biases ingrained in the system in an attempt to address them. As quasi-judicial 
                                                 
panellists of the Canadian refugee board told the woman “to go home, observe her country’s laws and ‘show consideration for the 
feelings of her father’”. 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
5 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) (adopted 10 December 
1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter UNCAT]. 
6 This paper will use the terms ‘women asylum seekers’ and ‘women complainants’ interchangeably. 
7 Byrnes, A.  ‘Using International Human Rights Law and Procedures to Advance Women’s Human Rights’ in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean 
M. Koenig (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law (1st edn, Transnational Pub 2000) 83. 
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bodies considered as the authoritative legal interpreter of the ICCPR and the UNCAT,8 the HRC and the 
CAT respectively, have been playing essentially important role in creating a space wherein to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding of how human rights are translated into practice—the materials 
produced by the treaty bodies have been used by activists as a basis from which to frame their rights-based 
arguments on,9 in a manner whereby states would be more willing to hear.10  
 
Part II begins with a discussion on the definition of the principle of non-refoulement and discussing the 
scope of protection guaranteed under Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the UNCAT. Part III then 
outlines feminist critiques of international law, including a discussion on the patriarchal structures of 
international law and how international law is gendered. Part IV then is a feminist critique of decisions made 
by the HRC and the CAT. Part V makes recommendations derived from the case studies. Finally, I conclude 
that unless the HRC and the CAT transform their understanding of the individuality of women complainants, 
the Committees will continue to ingrain gender bias in their decisions. 
 
II. The principle of non-refoulement 
 
This Section will define the principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention),11 the UNCAT, and the ICCPR. Under the UNCAT and the 
ICCPR, I will outline the scope of protection these treaties accord to individuals and how the CAT and HRC 
have interpreted what would constitute as ‘substantial grounds’ for believing that the complainants would 
be at risk of torture or ill-treatment. 
 
The principle of non-refoulement is the “cornerstone of asylum and of international refugee law,” reflecting 
the commitment to guarantee human rights to all individuals, particularly, the rights to life as well as to 
                                                 
8 See Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
905, 913–14, 917–19, 924–6.  
9 See Byrnes (n7) 79, 108-109. 
10 Rachael Lorna Johnstone, ‘Feminist Influences on the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 148, 
185. 
11 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 [hereinafter 
Refugee Convention]. 
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freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.12 These, together with other 
rights, are put at risk when individuals are returned to another State.   
 
International law establishes a normative framework on the principle of non-refoulement. First expressed 
in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention,13 the principle of non-refoulement prohibits States Parties from 
expelling or returning a refugee, defined to be any person who: 
 
…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or 
unwilling to return to it.14  
 
The principle of non-refoulement likewise applies to an asylum seeker, defined to be an individual who is 
seeking international protection but whose claim for refugee status has yet to be decided on by the country 
where he or she has submitted his/her claim.15 All refugees are initially asylum seekers, but not all asylum 
seekers will be recognized as refugees.16 
 
Following the Refugee Convention, subsequent international human rights treaties have incorporated the 
principle of non-refoulement in their texts.17 Because of the lack of a mechanism under the Refugee 
                                                 
12 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement’ (Refworld, November 1997) 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html> accessed 16 September 2019. 
13 Refugee Convention, art 33. 
14 Id, art 1a(2). 
15 Frances Nicholson and Judith Kumin, ‘A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems’ (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017) 17 < https://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.pdf> accessed 4 
October 2019.  
16 Ibid. 
17 David Weissbrodt and Isabel Hortreiter, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International 
Human Rights Treaties’ (1999) 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 2. 
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Convention, refugees and asylum seekers have increasingly been resorting to human rights treaty 
monitoring mechanisms, such as the CAT and the HRC.18  
 
i. Convention Against Torture 
 
a. Scope of protection 
 
CAT has a mandate over Article 3 of the UNCAT, which prohibits the transfer of a person to another State 
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture”.19 The principle of non-refoulement is “an inherent part of the overall absolute and imperative nature 
of the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment”.20 
 
Article 3 of the UNCAT reads: 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.21 
 
                                                 
18 Alice Edwards, ‘Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right to Enjoy Asylum’ (2005) 17 Int'l J. Refugee L. 298. 
19 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) (adopted 10 December 
1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter UNCAT] art 3 (1).  
20 United Nations General Assembly ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’  (1 September 2004) UN Doc. A/59/324, para. 28. 
21 UNCAT, art 1. 
 9 
Three elements are required to demonstrate a finding of ‘torture’. First, the person must be subjected to 
severe pain or suffering. As explicitly defined in UNCAT, pain can be inflicted either by physical or mental 
means. Examples of recognized psychological harm include “anguish, humiliation, debilitation and fear 
caused by physical brutality, rape and sexual abuse and abuse of children, partners, other family members 
or associates; by threats of such brutalities and of death; and by methods of sensory deprivation, stress 
and manipulation designed to break the will of the tortured”.22 Rhonda Capelon cited the work of Amnesty 
International in describing the context of the psychological stress and manipulation prisoners of war suffer 
from. According to Amnesty International, torturers used a variety of techniques “designed to induce 
dependency, debilitation and dread and thereby destroy the personality and break the will”.23 It added that: 
 
conditioning techniques used by interrogators make it evident that gross acts of 
torture (such as electric shock, rape or tearing out fingernails) are situated within a 
coercive context of which such methods are merely an extension... Biderman['s] 
[chart of coercion] ... is by no means exhaustive of coercive methods, and it does 
not include the excessive physical abuse which many forms of torture employ; 
however, it demonstrates the essential character of stress manipulation and may 
perhaps, by virtue of its more "benign" content, reveal the intentions and results of 
torture f that is almost impossible to achieve when dealing with those massive 
assaults in which pain and disorientation are compressed.24 
 
Second, the purpose of the act must be for a certain intent. Article 1 enumerates the list of the most common 
purposes—(1) to obtain information or a confession (2) to punish someone for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed (3) to intimidate or coerce him or a third person or (4) 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. However, this list is not exhaustive.25 
 
                                                 
22 Rhonda Copelon, 'Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture' (1994) 25 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 313. 
23 Id., 314. 
24 Id., 52. 
25 Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988) 118. 
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Third, the acts must have been committed by or with the consent or acquiescence of government officials.  
 
Acknowledging the seriousness of the problem of torture as well as the government’s duty to not acquiesce 
or consent in the torture, protection from non-refoulement is non-derogable, i.e. it is absolute, no exception 
or derogation is allowed, but only in cases involving those in danger of becoming victims of torture.26  
 
While the CAT  itself has recognized that the “the definitional threshold between ill-treatment and torture is 
often not clear”,27 the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture explained that “the decisive criteria for 
distinguishing torture from [cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment] may best be understood to be the 
purpose of the conduct and the powerlessness of the victim, rather than the intensity of the pain or suffering 
inflicted.”28 Those in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not entitled to protection from 
non-refoulement.29 
 
b. Substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be at risk of torture 
upon return 
 
The standard of proof as indicated in the CAT requires “substantial grounds” for believing that one would 
be in danger of torture.30 The test to assess whether these substantial grounds exist contains subjective 
and objective criteria.31 The subjective criterion reflects the perspective of the CAT on whether there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be at risk of being tortured and not a certainty of 
whether the applicant would be tortured if returned.32  
 
                                                 
26 Weissbrodt and Hortreiter (n17) 8. 
27UN Committee Against Torture ‘General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties’ (2008) UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2, 
para 3. 
 28 United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak’ (2005) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6, paras. 39-40. 
29 Kristen Rosati, ‘The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative for Asylum Seekers’ (1997) 74 Interpreter 
Releases 1773, 1774). 
30 UNCAT, art 3(1).  
31 Weissbrodt and Hortreiter (n17) 12. 
32 Id., 14. 
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On the other hand, such belief must be objectively based on substantial grounds.33 CAT must make this 
assessment based on ‘all relevant considerations’ including evidence of a “consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights”. 34 However, such evidence is not determinative; additional 
grounds must be adduced indicating that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.35 Conversely, 
the absence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights does not mean that a person 
might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.36  
 
Other considerations may include the individual’s membership in a persecuted minority or opposition group 
as well as a history of detention and torture.37 Moreover, while the CAT focuses on the possibility of future 
harm, past torture would also be considered as strong evidence of a risk of torture.38 
 
CAT attempts to determine whether the risk of torture is ‘foreseeable, present, personal and real’.39 The 
burden of proof is upon the applicant40 who also has to show that the risk of torture goes “beyond mere 
theory or suspicion. However the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable.”41 
 
ii. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
a. Scope of protection 
 
Article 7 of the ICCPR provides a prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.42 The decisions of the HRC demonstrate that family members with a close relationship to the 
                                                 
33 Weissbrodt and Hortreiter (n17) 13. 
34 UNCAT, art 3(2). 
35 M.S. v Denmark (14 October 2015) Communication No. 571/2013 CAT/C/55/D/571/2013, para. 7.3; MAK v. Germany (17 May 
2004) Communication No. 214/2002 CAT/C/32/D/214/2002. 
36 Id., para. 7.3.  
37 UNCAT, art 3(2); Committee Against Torture (CAT), ‘CAT General Comment No. 1: Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention 
in the Context of Article 22 (Refoulement and Communications) (1997) CAT A/53/44, annex IX. 
38 Deborah E. Anker, ‘An Introduction to Relief Under Article 3 of the Torture Convention’, in Paul T. Lufkin (ed), Law of Asylum in the 
United States (3d ed. Refugee Law Center 1999).  
39 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the 
context of article 22, 9 February 2018. 
40 Id., para.6, para. 38.  
41 CAT General Comment No. 1 (n37). 
42 ICCPR, art 7. 
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victim may be entitled to reparation as indirect victims for the anguish and stress they have suffered 
because of the ill-treatment of the direct victims. In Quinteros v Uruguay, Almeda de Quinteros filed a case 
on behalf of her daughter Elena Quinteros and her behalf. Elena was arrested by the Uruguayan police 
force in the grounds of the Venezuelan Embassy. It was alleged that Elena was held in a military detention 
centre and was tortured. Almeda de Quinteros claimed that she was also a victim of a violation of Article 7 
of the ICCPR after being subjected to psychological torture from not knowing the whereabouts of her 
daughter and Article 17 for interference with her family life. In this case, the HRC stated that: 
 
the Committee... understands the anguish and stress caused to the mother by the 
disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning her fate and 
whereabouts. The author has the right to know what has happened to her daughter. In 
these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered by her 
daughter in particular, of article 7.9.43 
 
i. Substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be at risk of 
irreparable harm upon return 
 
While the ICCPR does not explicitly provide for the principle of non-refoulement, the HRC has interpreted 
that States Parties to the ICCPR may not: 
 
remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 [right to 
life] and 7 [prohibition of torture] of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal 
is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed”.44 
 
                                                 
43 María del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros et al. v. Uruguay (21 July 1983) Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 
at 138 (1990), para. 14.  
44 HRC, General Comment No. 20, Prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment, para. 12; Human Rights 
Committee, ‘General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ 
(2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 9. 
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The HRC further stated that States Parties must not expose individuals to the risk of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon deportation to another country.45 Thus, the protection 
accorded by the ICCPR is wider than that of the UNCAT.46 As mentioned earlier, UNCAT only prohibits 
return to another country where there is a danger of torture. 
 
In the assessment of ‘real risk’, the HRC relies on “all the circumstances such as the duration and manner 
of the treatment, its physical or mental effects, as well as the sex, age, and mental health” of the 
complainant.47  
 
In the past, the HRC has also considered whether the complainant would have an “internal flight 
alternative”, i.e. whether the complainant would be able to easily relocate to another part of the country 
where chances of persecution may be lower.48 However, it acknowledged that the internal flight alternative 
is not always a reliable or effective remedy.49 
 
The HRC has made clear that the burden of proof in establishing torture cannot rest alone with the author 
of the communication, considering that the individual and the State party “do not always have equal access 
to the evidence and that frequent the State party alone has access to the relevant information.50 
 
In summary, the standard of proof as stated in the UNCAT and the ICCPR requires ‘substantial grounds’ 
for believing that the complainant would be at risk of torture or irreparable harm. For a complainant to 
receive protection from the principle of non-refoulement, s/he must prove that there are substantial grounds 
to believe that s/he would be at risk of torture or irreparable if deported to another country. The HRC has 
recognized the psychological torture suffered by the victim’s family members because of the anguish and 
stress they had to suffer from because of the treatment that the direct victims have received. 
                                                 
45 General Comment No. 20 (n44), para. 9.  
46 Sarah Joseph, Katie Mitchell and Linda Gyorki, ‘Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims: A Handbook on the Individual Complaints 
Procedures of the UN Treaty Bodies’ (World Organisation Against Torture, 2014) 189 
<https://www.omct.org/files/2014/11/22956/v4_web_onusien_en_omc14.pdf> accessed 4 October 2019. 
47 Vuolanne v. Finland (2 May 1989) Communication No. 265/1987 CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987, at para. 9.2.  
48 Ms. Diene Kaba v. Canada (21 May 2010) Communication No. 1465/2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/98/D/1465/2006. 
49 General comment No. 4 (n39) para. 47.  
50 Womah Mukong v. Cameroon (10 August 1994) Communication No. 458/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.2. 
 14 
 
III. Feminist critiques of international law  
 
To be able to properly examine the decisions of the HRC and the CAT, it is best to outline first the feminist 
critiques of international law that will serve as the background of the arguments in the next Section. 
Considering the limitations on space, the following discussion will not be exhaustive but will pertain more 
to issues that will be further elaborated upon in the succeeding sections of this paper. This Section will 
discuss the lack of gender balance in the HRC and the CAT, which reinforces the patriarchal structures 
present in international law. This Section also discusses the implications of the persistence of the male-
defined norms resulting from these patriarchal structures. 
 
Lack of gender balance in the HRC and the CAT 
 
At the international level, feminist scholars have lamented the lack of gender balance in human rights treaty 
bodies.51 A focus on the male point of view in the law then entails preoccupation of international legal 
instruments with the rights of men.52 As a result, as Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright posited, because of 
such patriarchal structure, international law remains insensitive to issues relating to women.53 As 
demonstrated by CAT, which has only four female members out of its ten members,54 such lack of gender 
balance has resulted in it paying “…little attention to the question of whether women may be subjected to 
torture or other ill treatment in a manner or under circumstances that differ from the experiences of men”.55 
It is also not surprising that scholars have described the work of the CAT, particularly in relation to torture 
of women, as “myopic”.56 
 
                                                 
51 H. Charlesworth, ‘Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations’ (2005) Harv. Hum. 
Rts. J. 18, 1-18. 
52 Charlesworth, C. Chinkin, S. Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AJIL, (1991), 625. 
53 Id., 621. 
54 Office for the High Commission for Human Rights, ‘Treaty Body Database: Committee Members’ (25 June 2004), 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx> 
55 Andrew Byrnes, The Convention Against Torture’ in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig (eds), Women and International Human 
Rights Law (1st edn, Transnational Pub 2000). 
56 Id., 214.  
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Organizational structures in international law dominated by men and defined by male norms has various 
implications including: (1) the identification of human rights as men’s rights (2) a misunderstanding of 
women’s harms (3) the essentializing of women and (4) the relegation of women’s issues to the private 
sphere.  
 
(1) Human rights as men’s rights 
 
The main feminist criticism in international law is that it overwhelmingly addresses violations committed in 
the public sphere (as opposed to the private sphere of the family)57. Because the structures of international 
law are ‘thoroughly gendered’, 58 issues traditionally concerning men are perceived as human rights issues. 
In short, as some feminist scholars have argued, the image of the rights-bearer in international law is 
implicitly masculine.59 Women have, thus, been produced as the ‘other’. In the words of Celina Romany, 
“[w]omen are the paradigmatic alien subjects of international law. To be an alien is to be an other, an 
outsider. Women are aliens within their states and aliens within an exclusive international club of states 
which constitutes international society.”60 International law then does not deal with issues that 
accommodate the experiences of women61–issues concerning women, such as domestic violence and 
sexual abuse, are relegated to a separate sphere, where they are largely ignored62 and are considered 
secondary or trivial.63  
 
With the rights-bearer being envisaged as masculine, the male view is adopted as the standard in 
international law. At the onset, the use of a masculine pronoun in international human rights instruments, 
‘even if it is intended to be generic’,64 including in the UNCAT, affirms and reinforces sexual hierarchy and 
                                                 
57 Id., 184. 
58 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright (n52) 613, 621-25. 
59 D Otto, 'Disconcerting "Masculinities': Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law' in D Buss and A 
Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Hart, 2005). 
60 C. Romany, ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law’ (1993) 6 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87. 
61 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright (n52)  613, 628. 
62 Id.,  613, 625.  
63 See Charlotte Bunch, ‘Feminist Visions of Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century’, in Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney 
(eds), Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge (Springer Netherlands, 1993) 967-969.  
64 Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright  (n52) 628-30. 
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supports the exclusion of women in human rights law.65 Following the definition of torture as previously 
discussed in the preceding section, the form of torture prohibited under international law traditionally 
involves a male perpetrator, be it the military forces or the police, and a male victim, often a political 
dissident or an imprisoned male criminal.66  
 
Because rights and the interpretation of those rights fail to reflect the nature and extent of violations faced 
by women in the public sphere,67  using men as a yardstick68 becomes all the more problematic especially 
in instances when men are not suffering from the same disadvantages as the women are.69 International 
law imposes an additional burden on women to try to fit in gender-neutral categories to receive protection 
from the State. However, fitting in gender-neutral categories is often not viable since certain violations of 
the human rights of women take place because of their sex/gender, i.e. rape, domestic violence and female 
genital mutilation. Interpreted with a male yardstick, women’s claims will most likely be rejected.70 For 
instance, sexual violence committed against a woman during interrogation by the government may be 
considered only as a private act, and not as torture committed by state actors.71  
 
In another instance, in refugee law, it is difficult for women to meet the seemingly neutral eligibility criteria 
for refugee status because the enumerated grounds— race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion—“often do not reflect the private reality of women’s lives”.72 As a reflection 
of the lack of awareness of the gender issues in pre-1970s,73 the Refugee Convention has been “interpreted 
through a framework of male experience. The main problem facing women as asylum seekers is the failure 
of decision-makers to incorporate the gender-related claims of women into their interpretation of the existing 
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enumerated grounds and their failure to recognize the political nature of seemingly private acts of harm to 
women.”74  
 
This is not to say that violence against women has been completely unrecognized as falling under the 
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The HRC, under 
article 7 of the ICCPR, “has condemned domestic violence, rape and sexual violence, female genital 
mutilation, clandestine abortions, unequal treatment in relation to punishment for adultery, the failure to 
outlaw marital rape or levirate, honour crimes, and early marriage”.75 The CAT, on the other hand, has 
referred to particular experiences of torture faced by women. It has regularly expressed its concern in issues 
involving the sexual violence and assault experienced by female detainees and prisoners in the hands of 
law-enforcement personnel for the purpose of extracting information on the whereabouts of their husbands 
or other relatives.76 Despite all this, as will be demonstrated by the next Section’s analysis of the views or 
decisions by the HRC and the CAT, still, women’s experiences are largely ignored. 
 
(2) Misapprehension of women’s harms 
 
According to Robin West’s work on ‘gender-specified injuries’, what defines women apart from men is that 
women do not exist as separate autonomous individuals but in connection with others.77 Thus, West 
suggests that women suffer more than men, and importantly, women suffer in ways that men do not.78 
Because of this, the pain women feel is not understood by the larger community and thus, women’s pain 
still fails to receive adequate attention or be provided with a legal remedy: 
 
 [W]omen's distinctive, gender-specific injuries are now or have in the recent past been 
variously dismissed as trivial (sexual harassment on the street); consensual (sexual 
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harassment on the job); humorous (non-violent marital rape); participatory, 
subconsciously wanted, or self-induced (father/daughter incest); natural or biological, and 
therefore inevitable (childbirth); sporadic, and conceptually continuous with gender-
neutral pain (rape, viewed as a crime of violence); deserved or private (domestic 
violence); non-existent (pornography); incomprehensible (unpleasant and unwanted 
consensual sex); or legally predetermined (marital rape, in states with the marital 
exemption).79 
 
However, men fail to understand the gender-specific injuries of women.80 On the other hand, men’s pain is 
usually validated because it is widely recognized as wrong, and not trivialized.81 As West highlighted in 
another context, men do not have to remain under threat of sexual abuse throughout their lives in the way 
women do.82 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the HRC has made some progress in recognizing how women 
experience pain differently, as demonstrated by the case of Quinteros v Uruguay. Indeed, by recognizing 
both the mother and daughter as victims of the State’s actions, HRC has acknowledged the difference 
between the harm women feel from the harm suffered by those connected to them. Despite this progress 
in acknowledging the anguish women suffer from the experiences of their husbands or male relatives, 
women remain recognized in cases of torture only because of their familial relationship with the victim, i.e. 
when they are recognized as the wives, mothers, or daughters of the male victims.83 In this sense, “women 
gain access to the protective scope of the torture provisions on male-defined terms”.84  
 
On the other hand, the emotional harm women experience because of the physical and non-physical harm 
they suffer from in the hands of government authorities continue to not be recognized. In tort law, such is 
described as the “dichotomy…between physical harm and emotional harm”, whereby physical injury weighs 
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more than emotional and relational injury.85 As a result,  women become more disadvantaged “because 
important and recurring injuries in women’s lives are more often classified as lower-ranked emotional or 
relational harms.”86 
 
(3) Essentializing women 
 
a. Failure to identify the complex structural and intersectional causes of human rights 
violations against women  
 
After discussing the differences in the way men and women suffer from pain, the next step would be to 
appreciate the differences amongst women. The next major part of the feminist critique to be discussed in 
this section highlights how international human rights law fails to address the intersectional causes of the 
marginalization of women’s rights. This is because international human rights law is based on individual 
human rights claims, which “risk universalizing the complex and hugely varied experiences of the world’s 
women, and essentializing the causes of their oppression”.87 In this sense, international human rights law 
fails to recognize that women’s subordination does not result from gender alone and more so, that women 
are not a homogenous category.88 As a result, the possibility of identifying the causes of women’s 
oppression becomes close to nil and thus, women continue to be vulnerable. 
 
Kimberly Crenshaw has argued in her work on the theory of intersectionality: "Because the intersectional 
experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality 
into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which [women of colour] are 
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subordinated.”89 In Crenshaw’s work, she explained that various groups of people encounter different forms 
of discriminatory behaviour because of the intersection of two or more categories.90 Other than gender, 
intersectional considerations include class, race, immigration status, sexual orientation, and religion. Power 
and privilege, like disadvantage and discrimination, differ depending on one’s location in the interlocking 
spectrums of identity. For instance, because the identities of black men and women vary along the axis of 
race and sex, black women would have unique vulnerabilities and thus, may suffer from a different kind of 
violence and discrimination as opposed to black men.91 While Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality was 
focused on the unique way black women are oppressed, her theory may be applied to other vulnerable 
groups in a discussion of the complexity of discrimination and oppression along multiple axes.92  
 
In the case of asylum seekers, they balance multiple identities as they suffer from a range of varying 
degrees of oppression. Women asylum seekers are oppressed because they are women, they are 
immigrants, and they are women of colour. They are also from a non-English speaking background and 
thus they often can communicate only in their own language and do not and cannot speak the national 
language of the State where they are applying asylum from. Often, they are victims or survivors of gender-
specific violence. In short, women asylum seekers exemplify the interrelated vulnerabilities of migration and 
refugee status, race, and poverty, among others. The convergence of these factors makes their sufferings 
distinct from male asylum seekers.  
 
In recent years, the HRC and the CAT have begun to mention intersectionality in their work. The CAT has, 
in General Comment No. 2, emphasized the value of intersectionality: 
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The Committee emphasizes that gender is a key factor. Being female intersects with other 
identifying characteristics or status of the person such as race, nationality, religion, sexual 
orientation, age, immigrant status, etc. to determine the ways that women and girls are 
subject to or at risk of torture or ill-treatment and the consequences thereof.93 
 
The HRC has also issued General Comment No. 28 on the equality of rights between men and women, 
stating that discrimination on the basis of gender is often ‘intertwined’ with discrimination on the basis of 
other grounds.94 However, as will be discussed in the next Section, the HRC and the CAT have rendered 
views or decisions without much analysis of the intersectional vulnerabilities that women asylum seekers 
are facing or may face. Still, the HRC and the CAT continue to view women as a unitary category.  
 
b. Men as protectors and defenders of women 
 
Dianne Otto highlighted that women, especially in early legal instruments, 
 
were valued for their chastity, their prioritization of mother hood and domesticity, their 
acceptance of the heterosexual family hierarchy and the paternal protection of the state, 
its laws and its wars. In contradistinction, male figures were produced as women’s 
defenders and moral superiors (apart from the racialized criminals who trafficked them) 
and the active, public protecting masculine subject was fashioned as the marker of full 
humanity, autonomous and self-determining, and in no need of special rules for his 
protection.95 
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In characterizing men as ‘women’s defenders and moral superiors’, women’s role becomes restricted in 
that their primary role is limited to being wives and mothers in the family’s home.96 In turn, this promotes a 
negative stereotype of women being vulnerable and dependent—socially, politically, economically, and 
personally—on men, specifically on their male relatives, while men are considered autonomous. At the 
same time, women’s perspective becomes invisible because of this assumed dependency. 
 
Such dependence of women on men is best exemplified by the common law doctrine of coverture, under 
which a woman’s legal existence is merged with that of the husband upon marriage. In common law, the 
husband owns his wife and thus, he controls all aspects of her existence.97 Along with this obligation is a 
corresponding right to “give his wife moderate correction” or “restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any 
gross misbehavior.”98 
 
(4) The relegation of women’s issues to the private sphere 
 
The invisibility of women’s experiences is further reinforced by the public/private distinction. A feminist 
critique of the public/private dichotomy relevant to the succeeding section of this paper questions the extent 
to which the State can regulate matters that are not considered to be within the public sphere. As Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright have noted, “[b]ecause men generally are not the 
victims of sex discrimination, domestic violence, and sexual degradation and violence, for example, these 
matters can be consigned to a separate sphere and tend to be ignored”,99  i.e., what Rhonda Copelon calls 
as the  “persistent trivialization of violations against women”.100 While this characterization reflects only one 
aspect of the public/private dichotomy, it provides an important way of identifying the gendered nature of 
the law. Moreover, it is widely believed that the family, being a realm filled with love and harmony of 
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interests, does not require legal interference. Thus, ‘natural’ familial instincts will ensure everyone’s 
welfare.101  
 
In the context of women asylum seekers specifically, scholars have pointed out that the main problem they 
face is the failure of decisionmakers “to recognize the political nature of seemingly private acts of harm to 
women”.102 Regardless of its nature, violence against women is rarely considered “as a political act, as a 
method for one group to exert control over another, as a symbol of power dominance, or as a direct result 
of the discriminatory denial of human rights.103 As a result, applications from women asylum seekers are 
often rejected.104 
 
Slowly, international law has expanded the doctrine of state responsibility to include complicity of state 
agents with the conduct of the non-state actors as well as the failure of the State to exercise ‘due diligence’ 
in preventing or remedying actions of non-state actors.105 In the context of torture, as one scholar 
highlighted, “[Article 1 of the UNCAT] includes state ‘acquiescence’ as a mechanism of state responsibility. 
Not only does such language grant the [CAT] license to consider information about domestic violence in 
which state acquiescence has been persuasively demonstrated; it compels the Committee to do so”.106 
Thus, even if the perpetrator is a non-State actor, a State will remain to be responsible for protecting and 
respecting human rights. In it work, CAT has also addressed trafficking.107 It also has explicitly ruled that 
“[female genital mutilation] causes permanent physical harm and severe psychological pain to the victims 
which may last for the rest of their lives, and considers that the practice of subjecting a woman to FGM is 
contrary to the obligations enshrined in the [UNCAT].”108 The HRC has demonstrated a similar 
understanding concerning violence committed against women in the private sphere: “In States parties 
where the practice of genital mutilation exists information on its extent and on measures to eliminate it 
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should be provided. The information provided by States parties on all these issues should include measures 
of protection, including legal remedies, for women whose rights under article 7 have been violated.”109 
However, there is still much work to be done. As will be further discussed in the next section, the HRC and 
the CAT tend to focus more on relegating gender-specific harms into the realm of the private sphere, i.e. in 
the hands of the women asylum seekers’ family, instead of assessing whether the women asylum seekers’ 
country of origin is willing or able to protect them from such harms. 
 
This Section examined the patriarchal structures oppressing women, which are well-entrenched in 
international law. The language used in different international human rights treaties shows that men are still 
used as the universal standard, while women’s experiences are considered as the exception to the norm. 
Because of this, issues relating to women have still not been given much attention in international law and 
continue to be relegated to the private sphere, absent any interference from the State because the family 
is expected to serve as a bastion of love and harmony. The dominance of male norms also results in the 
failure to identify the intersectional causes of human rights violations, in the misunderstanding of women’s 
harms, and the essentializing of women.  
 
IV. Examination of communications filed with the HRC and the CAT  
 
This Article argues that in communications decided by the HRC and the CAT, women asylum seekersare 
not considered as individual human beings with an identity separate from their role in the family. In arguing 
so, I will discuss the patterns I have identified in the HRC and the CAT’s assessment of these 
communications. First, there is an overreliance on the woman asylum seeker’s family protection network. 
It seems that the HRC and the CAT assume that the presence of the family support network in the woman 
asylum seeker’s country of origin negates and addresses the risk of torture that the women might face 
there. Second, when a woman asylum seeker is part of a family unit, her husband or male relative is usually 
the primary complainant and she and any children are secondary complainants. Therefore, any individual 
claims she may have are often overlooked and not assessed. Finally, the focus of the HRC and the CAT 
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on sexual violence, to the neglect of women asylum seekers’ emotional and psychological pain results in 
not fully capturing the experience and suffering of women. 
 
(1) There is too much dependence on the presence or absence of women asylum seekers’ 
support network in the form of male protection in determining whether a woman would be 
at risk of torture or irreparable harm. 
 
The majority of the cases filed with the HRC and the CAT have repeatedly emphasized that women asylum 
seekers could return to their country of origin because they could rely on a support network for protection 
there. In this subsection, I selected two cases filed with the HRC and the CAT to illustrate various reasons 
why a support network in their countries of origin must not be a determining factor in an assessment of 
women asylum seekers’ claims. 
 
In the case of M.J.S. v the Netherlands,110 the woman asylum seeker claimed that her deportation to Côte 
d’Ivoire by the Netherlands would put her at risk of female genital mutilation, in violation of her rights under 
article 3 of the UNCAT. The CAT ruled that the complainant has not discharged her burden of proof for the 
it to believe that she would run a real, foreseeable, personal and present risk of being subjected to torture 
upon her return to her country of origin because it found that  “the complainant has failed to show that 
someone in her family specifically will pressure her mother, who is clearly against female genital mutilation, 
into practicing the procedure, which will put her at real and personal risk of being subjected to such 
mutilation.”111 
 
CAT’s decision presented a lopsided analysis between the State’s duty to protect, on one hand, and the 
presence or absence of a woman asylum seeker’s family protection network, on the other hand—with a 
superficial analysis of the State’s compliance with its duty to protect and an overreliance on the family 
protection network. In examining whether ‘substantial grounds’ exist to believe that the woman asylum 
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seeker would be in danger of being tortured if deported, CAT made an inadequate assessment on whether 
the woman asylum seeker’s country of origin effectively protects against female genital mutilation. CAT 
simply took note of the reports submitted by the Netherlands stating that the percentage of women who 
have undergone female genital mutilation within the country in general is falling, with 80 percent opposed 
to female genital mutilation.112 It further noted that the prevalence of female genital mutilation among women 
aged 45-49 is merely at 46.9 percent, among 15-19 year old at 31.3 percent and among girls under 15 
years of age at 11 percent.113 However, these figures are not persuasive and do not, in any way, reflect the 
commitment of the State to protect women and girls from female genital mutilation.  
 
While the State party the Netherlands acknowledged that in the north-west, where the complainant’s 
mother’s tribe is from, 88 percent of women and girls have undergone the procedure, it argued on the 
“successful prosecution by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in some female genital mutilation cases in 
2017” [emphasis added]114. However, as declared by the State Party itself, between January and 
September 2013, “the government of Côte d’Ivoire intervened in initiation ceremonies on 10 occasions, 
including in Touba, the region where the complainant’s mother is from.”115 It is not understandable how the 
government’s intervention in only 10 initiation rites in over 10 months is particularly laudable. If anything, 
these figures even show further proof that the government had not prioritized the fight against female genital 
mutilation. 
 
As to the analysis of the complainant’s family protection network, the CAT relied on the strength of 
complainant’s mother, who was assumed to be able to resist any pressure for complainant to be subjected 
to female genital mutilation. According to this approach, in cases where there the female complainant would 
have someone who would protect her when returned to her home country, which in this case was identified 
to be the complainant.’s mother or their extended family, there would be no substantial ground to believe 
that she would be at a risk of torture.  
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This approach demonstrates one of the problems associated with the public/private distinction as discussed 
in the previous Section—identifying something as ‘private’ to support a claim of non-interference. States 
may be unwilling or unable to make any legal interference, particularly in cases involving traditional 
practices, because they are considered to be family matters.116 As discussed in the previous section, there 
is an assumption that “because the family realm is one of love and harmony of interests, there is no need 
for legal interference.”117 Moreover, such reasoning is based on the premise that ‘free and equal adults’ 
within the family have agreed to have such arrangements and that in order to respect that autonomy, the 
State must suspend its interference.118 Thus, the solution for the problem women asylum seekers are facing 
may be found in the private sphere rather than the public sphere. In other words, it is supposed that it would 
be best to leave the problems of the women asylum seekers in the hands of their families, without any 
external interference of states. As discussed earlier, the family is not necessarily a refuge of safety and 
affection; the fact is that family members’ interests often conflict. When conflicts take place, they are 
resolved not by a “benevolent consideration of everyone’s interests”, but by power.119 
 
The CAT took note of the State Party’s argument “that the complainant’s mother can live independently and 
care for her children; the fact that she is a single parent does not alter this, as she is more highly educated 
than the average Ivorian woman and she was able to avoid her own re-cutting, leave her family and 
community and flee to Europe.”120 CAT’s decision was based on an underlying presumption that the 
complainant’s mother would be strong enough to resist any kind of pressure for her daughter to undergo 
female genital mutilation, despite what their extended family might say. How could the female complainant 
have “failed to show that someone in her family specifically will pressure her mother who is clearly against 
female genital mutilation, into practicing the procedure” when she had repeatedly argued that her mother 
was forced to undergo female genital mutilation herself? Indeed, her mother was able to flee Europe to 
avoid her re-cutting, but what about the first female genital mutilation that the complainant’s mother did not 
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manage to avoid? The complainant’s mother had to be circumcised at 19 years old after her parents, who 
were against female genital mutilation, died.121 Not only was the complainant’s mother forced into being 
subjected to female genital mutilation, her aunt also married the complainant’s mother off to two different 
wealthy men in exchange for money.122 The complainant’s mother fled Côte d’Ivoire because her husband 
did not believe that she had undergone a proper female genital mutilation and demanded a more extensive 
procedure (re-cutting).123 Moreover, CAT’s decision overlooks the fact that the complainant’s mother was 
suffering from severe psychiatric disorders. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and 
even attempted to commit suicide.124  
 
Contrary to what the CAT argued, the complainant’s extended family could or would have influence on the 
decision for her to go through female genital mutilation especially since, upon the deportation of the 
complainant and her mother, they might need to stay with members of her extended family.125 If the 
extended family managed to force the complainant’s mother to undergo circumcision, there is no indication 
that they would not do the same with the female complainant. The CAT’s conclusion was without 
consideration of the fact that it would be difficult for them to resettle in another part of her country of origin 
and start a new life without the help of their extended family who previously pressured complainant’s mother 
to undergo circumcision. 
 
The HRC made the same mistake of highlighting family protection much more than the State’s duty to 
protect in the case of K.S. and M.S. vs Denmark.126 In this case, M.S. is a 68-year old single Afghan mother 
who was diagnosed as suffering from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and personality change. 
She argued that she would be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment if returned to Afghanistan because of her status as “an extremely vulnerable individual, i.e. a 
single woman with health issues.”127 Her application for a resident permit was rejected mainly because “she 
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would be returning with her adult son, K.S., who has lived in Afghanistan for many years, and therefore she 
could not be considered as not having a “support network”. 128 The Committee ruled that complainant M.S.’ 
removal to Afghanistan would not constitute a violation of her rights under article 7 of the ICCPR.  
 
The HRC’s approach, once again, highlights family protection as the focal point of discussion rather than 
the State’s duty to protect.129 Far from being the bastion of love and harmony that treaty bodies claim it to 
be, the family as a social unit is not necessarily a safe haven for women asylum seekers in their country of 
origin.130 Such decision lacks normativity. Is the complainant’s son under any obligation to protect his 
mother? Is the complainant, as the mother, entitled to protection by her son? The HRC simply assumes 
that M.S.’ son will protect her without indicating any reason for it.  
 
Moreover, the HRC’s rationale makes it seem as if women’s risk of torture stems from the women’s lack of 
male protectors rather than the societal context in which the women are operating in—a society where 
single women are subjected to hostility.131 In reality, the presence or absence of a support network does 
not necessarily pre-empt the occurrence of any human rights violation against women. As Charlesworth 
and Chinkin argued, violence must be reconceptualized and must be seen as part of the structure of the 
universal subordination of women.132 Thus, violence against women cannot be considered as purely 
‘private’ or a mere aberrant behavior. Returning to a society hostile to her status, would put M.S., as a 
single woman,  at risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, regardless of the family protection 
network she has and regardless of whether or not she has male members to protect her. 
 
The case of K.S. and M.S. vs Denmark also reinforces stereotypes. Instead of recognizing women as 
intrinsic bearer of human rights, the focus on having a ‘male protection network’ subscribes to the traditional 
narrative of the weakness and vulnerability of women who need protection from men.133 Dianne Otto has 
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highlighted that by emphasizing the figure of the wife and mother who needs ‘protection’, women are 
rendered more as objects than full legal subjects of international law.134 On the other hand, men are 
portrayed as the defenders of women. Such representation of men and women reconstitute the traditional 
gender hierarchies as ‘natural’.135 Refugee law scholars have likewise criticized the notion of having a male 
protector for reinforcing “perceptions of women as inferior, vulnerable on the basis of their sex, and unable 
to survive without male family members”.136  
 
This kind of reasoning works under the premise that all men, by virtue of being men, are considered 
physically powerful. However, there is no factual indication that her son can care for her and support her 
financially at the same time. The HRC ignored the fact that her adult son himself has not been to 
Afghanistan since he was seven years old,137 and thus might not be able to carry out the presumption that 
he would take care of his mother. 
 
This paper does not undermine the value of having a strong family support upon a woman asylum seeker’s 
return to her country origin. What is problematic, however, is, as cases here demonstrate, “reliance on 
these assumptions or generalizations may distort the risk assessment in the individual case”.138  
 
In summary, in overly relying on the presence or absence of family support, the HRC and the CAT, at times, 
forget to examine whether or not the women asylum seekers’ countries of origin demonstrated that they 
were willing or able to make any legal interference. It seems that the suggestion of the HRC and the CAT 
is that the obligation to protect human rights could be discharged by the complainants’ family members and 
the State may thus be, absolved of such responsibility. Finally, in doing so, the HRC and the CAT reinforce 
the stereotype that men are women’s defenders. When this happens, it becomes easier to automatically 
equate maleness with capacity to protect, and as a result, easier to overlook the possibility that male 
relatives probably will not and cannot care and support the women complainants. 
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(2) Individual claims of women asylum seekers are often overlooked and not assessed when a 
joint complaint is lodged. 
 
This subsection will argue that when a female complainant files a joint complaint with the HRC or CAT as 
a dependent of their husbands or male relatives, any separate gender-specific aspect of their claims is 
often rendered invisible and is not assessed by the said Committees. Thus, the HRC and the CAT may fail 
to consider that a female complainant could be at risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment and other irreparable harm, independently of her relationship with her husband or male relative. 
This can have significant negative consequences for the female complainant, including being sent back to 
her home country where she will be at risk of harm. Independently assessing the claims of the female 
complainants in joint applications is necessary to ensure this does not happen, particularly where the 
husband’s claims fall short of meeting the necessary protection standard. 
 
Different countries apply different rules of procedure concerning asylum applications of immediate family 
members jointly applying for asylum, such as a husband and wife.139 Some states require refugee claims 
of spouses to be heard jointly unless one of the spouses wants to file a separate case for a valid reason 
(e.g. divorce).140 The primary advantage of this rule is that even if only one family member is found to have 
met the asylum standard, all family members would be deemed to be eligible for refugee status, therein 
following the principle of family unity.141 As highlighted by this subsection, spouses file their communications 
in the same manner with the HRC and the CAT. 
 
A drawback of this approach is the tendency in joint asylum applications for all family members for the 
husband or male relative’s claim to overshadow the claims of the women asylum seekers in the family, 
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regardless of the gender-specific nature of the violence committed against them. Thus, the success or 
failure of the claim becomes dependent on the husband or male relative’s claim.142  
 
As will be further demonstrated by different examples later on, from an analysis of communications filed 
with the HRC and the CAT, it is apparent that the HRC and the CAT treat married female asylum seekers 
as appendages of their husbands rather than as autonomous individuals with distinct and separate claims. 
This limitation aligns with the principle behind the doctrine of coverture as discussed earlier, conceiving 
women as passive objects in contrast with their husbands as active rights bearer. The problem with this is 
that it works on the premise that the facts of the case impact the victims in the same way. Based on the 
intersectional theory as discussed in the previous section, this does not hold. Intersectional gender theory 
requires that each person must be adjudicated upon individually because male experiences are distinct 
from those of women. Human rights violations are simply experienced differently.  
 
In R.G. et. al., vs Sweden, R.G, formerly an active resistance fighter in the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya143, 
filed a communication at the CAT together with his wife L.G. and their four minor children.144 While in this 
case, the CAT ruled that the complainant’s removal to the Russian Federation would constitute a breach of 
Article 3 of the UNCAT145, it is a good example to show how the CAT determines joint communications.  In 
the decision, the CAT stated “[a]s the cases of R.G.’s wife and their four children, who were under age at 
the time of the family’s asylum application in Sweden, are largely dependent upon his case, the Committee 
does not find it necessary to consider these cases individually.”146 It would be interesting to see how the 
CAT would have decided the cases of L.G. and the four children had it decided that R.G. failed to establish 
a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being tortured. Following the CAT’s reasoning of the case, it would 
not be difficult to imagine that if the communication failed, it would have likely led to a failure of the case of 
the whole family.  
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In another communication where the CAT rejected the complainants’ claims, a woman asylum seeker could 
have potentially succeeded on her claims had she been the primary applicant or had she raised her claims 
separately or had her claims been examined properly. The case of P.S.B. and T.K. vs Canada involved the 
first complainant, a male leader of a village’s Sikh community and the second complainant, being the first 
complainant’s wife.147 The first complainant had travelled to Thailand to raise money for the Sikh temple in 
his village. Upon his return, the Indian police interrogated him and accused him of raising funds for Sikh 
militants.148 Afterwards, he sought judicial recourse against police harassment.149 When the police found 
out about this, the two complainants were arrested and subjected to torture.150 The second complainant 
alleged that she was raped while in detention.151 The complainants claimed that the circumstances 
surrounding their situation in Punjab before their departure from India to Canada put them at risk of torture 
or cruel or other inhuman or degrading treatment.152 They also claimed that their expulsion to India would 
constitute a violation of Canada’s obligation under Article 3 of the UNCAT.153 The CAT found that the 
complainants did not adduce sufficient grounds to demonstrate that they would run a real, foreseeable, 
personal and present risk of being subjected to torture upon return to India.154  
 
In this case, it is significant that the CAT did not directly comment on the rape of the second complainant 
while in police custody. Examination of her allegation of rape is completely absent from the CAT’s 
consideration of the merits, demonstrating that the CAT can be blind towards gender issues and lack 
acknowledgement of violence against women.  The CAT did not decide the case in the same manner as it 
would have, had it been a communication solely filed by a woman. Had the CAT acknowledged the sexual 
violence that T.K. had experienced, this could potentially have been considered as strong evidence of a 
possibility of future torture. 
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Further absent from this decision is a consideration of the theory of intersectionality whereby a woman 
asylum seeker’s claim must be examined in a way in which categories including gender, culture, religion, 
and class intersect and how these intersections result in her subordination. While indeed it is true that the 
burden of proof is on the complainant, this paper recommends, as will be further elaborated on in section 
V of this paper, that the HRC and the CAT be more proactive in ensuring the claims of women complainants 
are assessed in an intersectional manner, particularly, given the vulnerabilities they face as a female. Thus, 
I argue that, recognizing the fact that the women asylum seeker bore the burden of proof in this case,155 
the CAT should have considered whether it was safe for a female Sikh to live in Punjab, and how India 
handles rape cases involving female Sikhs.   
 
As explained by Crenshaw, when women’s experiences are viewed along a “‘single-axis analysis that 
distorts’ the multidimensionality of…women's experiences”, women’s discrimination claims often fail.156 This 
is because it becomes difficult for women to pursue discrimination based on sex alone or based on race 
alone, for instance, as there are many inextricable factors to be taken into consideration, which constitute 
women’s multiple identities.157 Not only is T.K., the second complainant, a woman, she is also a Sikh. 
Neither did the Committee delve into the context of where T.K. will be deported to. How safe is it for female 
active Sikh to live in Punjab? How does India handle rape cases involving female Sikhs?  The CAT failed 
to resolve these questions.  
 
The case of P.S.B. and T.K. vs Canada clearly shows that women’s claims, when subsumed within the 
principal claim of a male head of household, become invisible and become tied to the outcome of the male 
complainant’s claim. In determining communications in this manner, the CAT reinforces the stereotype of 
women as dependents, whose rights are of secondary consideration.  
 
Procedurally, another problem arises concerning the extent of the influence the husband or male relative 
has in the women’s presentation of their cases. In practice, in cases where women asylum seekers apply 
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jointly with their husbands or male relatives, the latter may control communication with the family’s lawyer 
or prepare the application themselves without input from the women asylum seekers.158 Moreover, the male 
relatives or husbands would often prepare the application of the whole family, without having the women 
complainants involved or would always accompany the women complainants when they visit the lawyer’s 
office. 159  
 
In cases where women asylum seekers allege sexual violence, whether by their husband or by others, they 
will often be unwilling to disclose it in a joint hearing either because they fear their husband or fear being 
‘shamed’.160 Canada, for instance, has recognized that “women from societies where the preservation of 
one’s virginity or marital dignity is the cultural norm may be reluctant to disclose their sad experiences of 
sexual violence to keep their ‘shame’ to themselves alone and not dishonor their family or community.”161 
 
Said reluctance is demonstrated in the case of V.L. vs Switzerland where the complainant, together with 
her husband, submitted a joint application for asylum in Switzerland on 19 December 2002, which was 
rejected on 14 August 2003, and once again rejected on appeal on 15 September 2004.162 On 11 October 
2004, the female complainant had to request the Swiss authorities to reconsider her asylum application in 
its own right, rather than as part of her husband’s claims, since they had already separated.163 It was only 
then that the female complainant alleged that she suffered from sexual abuses by members of the police 
for the first time. She claimed that she had not raised this previously because when her husband had found 
out about the sexual abuses she suffered, “[he reacted with insults and humiliating remarks and forbade 
her to mention the sexual abuses to the Swiss authorities.”164 In short, the psychological pressure she 
received from her husband prevented her from reporting and mentioning the sexual abuses during their 
joint asylum applications.165 As justifiably noted by the CAT, the delay in the female complainant providing 
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a medical report in the domestic proceedings which supported the allegations of sexual abuse did not affect 
her credibility. The CAT recognized “that the loss of privacy and prospect of humiliation based on revelation 
alone of the acts concerned may cause both women and men to withhold the fact that they have been 
subject to rape and/or other forms of sexual abuse until it appears necessary. Particularly for women, there 
is the additional fear of shaming and rejection by their partner or family members.”166 
 
In summary, when the claims of women asylum seekers are jointly heard with their other family members’ 
claims, the gender-specific aspect of their claim is often ignored. This echoes the invisibility of the women’s 
interests and women are not recognized as individual human beings but as dependents. This adversely 
affects women asylum seekers as it impedes access to justice for women who seek protection from the 
HRC and the CAT in their own right.  It also affirms that women are defined by their roles as a subpart of a 
family and not as members of society. In this framing, the human rights of women asylum seekers are thus 
derived from their husbands. Moreover, while it is more expedient to merge the claims of women asylum 
seekers with the claims of their husbands or male relatives, it must be considered that in doing so, women 
are less likely to bring forward allegations of sexual abuses for fear of dishonouring their husbands and/or 
family.  
 
(3) The HRC and the CAT accord secondary status to the psychological violence women asylum 
seekers suffer from, thereby not fully capturing their experiences and suffering.  
 
This Section will illustrate how the HRC and the CAT minimize the suffering of women in a way that physical 
pain is considered more serious than emotional and psychological pain.  
 
In the case of V.L. vs Switzerland,167 as discussed in the previous section, the complainant was a Belarusian 
woman who was interrogated and raped by three police officers who wanted to obtain information about 
her husband’s whereabouts.168 In the said case, the CAT recognized that even when the complainant is 
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already separated from her husband, she remains vulnerable to harms that authorities might once again 
inflict on her as “she remains a source of contact and a means of pressuring him:”169 The CAT ruled that: 
 
The acts concerned, constituting among others multiple rapes, surely constitute infliction 
of severe pain and suffering perpetrated for a number of impermissible purposes, 
including interrogation, intimidation, punishment, retaliation, humiliation and 
discrimination based on gender. Therefore, the Committee believes that the sexual abuse 
by the police in this case constitutes torture even though it was perpetrated outside formal 
detention facilities.  
 
In this case, without analysing whether the existence of ‘severe pain and suffering’ and ‘purpose’ as 
elements of torture are present in the case, the CAT concluded that the sexual violence committed against 
the complainant by the police officers constituted torture. In other words, “severe pain or suffering is 
satisfied per se by rapes carried out by police officers or agents, even when this is outside of detention 
facilities.”170 Indeed, this recognition of rape as constituting torture is considered an advancement for the 
human rights of women.  
 
However, it would be interesting to compare and contrast the rationale of this case with two cases, which 
mostly involve the mental suffering of women asylum seekers. 
 
In the case of Y vs Switzerland, 171 the complainant claimed that her deportation to Turkey would constitute 
a violation by the Swiss authorities of article 3 of the UNCAT.172 The complainant shares an extraordinary 
resemblance with her elder sister who was very active politically.173 Since 1995 when her sister was 
arrested, authorities had put the complainant under surveillance, regularly following her and tapping her 
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telephone, because of suspicions of her engagement in the same activities as her sister and of her taking 
over her activities in the political underground movement.174 In February 1998, the police raided her house, 
arrested her and took her into custody for seven days.175 Her sister managed to escape in 2002 and flee to 
Turkey, which even intensified the police’s surveillance of the complainant.176 Because of being subjected 
to constant surveillance and intimidation, she developed severe mental health problems.177 In 2008, the 
complainant felt that she could no longer live under these circumstances, and thus arranged her illegal 
departure for Switzerland where she applied for asylum.178  
 
The State Party argued that it “finds exaggerated the alleged uninterrupted harassment and surveillance 
by Turkish authorities for years, including after the complainant’s sister fled the country in 2002,and argues 
that the authorities would have taken other measures had she been of interest to them.”179 The CAT ruled 
that the facts as presented do not permit it to conclude that the complainant’s return to Turkey would expose 
her to a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture. It said that the complainant failed to provide elements 
to demonstrate that the continuous surveillance, harassment, short-term arrests and persecution in Turkey 
would amount to torture. It further explained that “it is uncontested that the complainant herself has not 
been sentenced, prosecuted for, or accused of, any crime in Turkey; that she has not been politically active 
in Switzerland; and that she has not been cooperating with members of the PKK either in Turkey or in 
Switzerland.”180 The CAT did not take into account the emotional and psychological pain that the woman 
asylum seeker would suffer from should she be returned to her country of origin. 
 
In S.Z. v Denmark, on the other hand, the complainant argued that if she were deported to the Russian 
Federation, she would be at risk of torture because she is considered a rebel sympathizer and her son was 
actively involved with the rebels.181 Thus, she argued that her deportation would violate article 7 of the 
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ICCPR.182 The HRC held that her removal to the Russian Federation would not violate her rights under 
article 7 of the ICCPR.183 This ruling is untenable.  
 
The woman asylum seeker, in this case, had established that she would be at risk of being subjected to 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment because of said relationship with her son, 
a rebel who was able to seek asylum elsewhere. She alleged that the police authorities beat her with a 
baton and gave her electrical shocks through wires on her fingers until she lost consciousness. After the 
incident, she fled to Nazran, Ingushetia but the authorities continued to look for her, visiting and searching 
her house four to five times a month.184 She also claimed that in one instance, authorities detained her for 
about a week because her son helped the rebels and thus, she probably helped them too.  
 
The State Party recognized that government authorities have contacted the complainant since her eldest 
son’s departure from Chechnya and have visited her house on many occasions inquiring about his 
whereabouts, but noted that this was “without, however, exposing her to abuse on those occasions”.185 The 
HRC further took note of the argument of the State Party that “the author’s medical records did not indicate 
that she had been tortured but that she had trouble sleeping, suffered from nightmares and headaches, 
was worried and wanted to see a psychologist”.”186  
 
The HRC adjudicated the case by completely ruling out the possibility that the constant surveillance and 
threats the complainant suffered from, could have potentially reached the level of severity enough to 
constitute torture. This is despite the clear intent of the physical and psychological harm brought about by 
the authorities on the woman asylum seeker in the case, which is to extract information about her son’s 
whereabouts. The HRC, without providing any reason, agreed with Denmark’s allegation that the 
nightmares and headaches, as well as her difficulty in sleeping, are no indication of torture. 
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The difference in the Committees’ treatment of the first case involving sexual violence against women and 
the two cases involving mental suffering could potentially be attributed to the predominant focus of the 
discourse on sexual violence, while other gendered harms remain excluded. In both cases, the HRC and 
the CAT failed to consider the cumulative significance of harmful events and likewise failed to consider the 
non-physical harms of government authorities against the women asylum seekers. Indeed, in these two 
cases, the HRC and the CAT dismissed the women asylum seekers as hysterical or debased their emotions 
as unimportant. These decisions fail to value the psychological violence the women asylum seekers had 
been through. What is absent from the analyses is an examination of whether the cumulative harms, 
including the psychological suffering, would reach the threshold of severity sufficient to constitute torture. 
This way, the HRC and the CAT minimized the suffering of the women asylum seekers. 
 
The cases indicate that the HRC and the CAT require seriously bodily injury for harm to reach the level of 
torture. Such kinds of rulings exemplify the feminist critique in international law as discussed in the previous 
section, whereby law is set up in a way that physical pain is considered more serious than emotional and 
psychological pain.187 Scholars have argued that adjudicators are more likely to underestimate the 
likelihood of non-physical harms, including psychological harm, which are difficult to visualize, as compared 
to the vividness that can be brought about by an image of physical mutilations in female genital 
mutilations.188 Therefore, it is much easier to show scars to demonstrate pain or suffering than when one 
is frightened.  
 
Women, in general, are put at a disadvantage in this scenario because there is a tendency towards disbelief 
when it comes to recognizing women’s pain stemming from the stereotype that women are more emotional, 
i.e. women are inclined to exaggerate. As a result, the abuses women suffer from are often considered as 
“exaggerated, hysterical or untrue”.189 The law and its interpretation by treaty bodies then fail to fully account 
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for the traumatic events women suffer from, and therefore, fail to fully capture the harms women are 
subjected to. Ultimately, the HRC and the CAT considered psychological violence suffered by women as 
secondary in status, if not wholly absent,190 failing to take into account that threats “may cause the recipient 
to live in a constant state of fear that the threat will be acted on. The level of distress may in turn lead the 
recipients to alter their lifestyle or routine to try and avoid the threatened harm.”191 
 
Albeit in the context of international criminal law, feminists have identified the danger in focusing too much 
emphasis on sexual violence, “creating a perception that the ‘gender’ aspect has been covered, thus 
marginalizing other experiences”.192 This ignores the fact that “violence against women is about domination 
and control, and can include verbal violence, threats, coercion and economic control along with physical 
trauma”.193  Moreover, the concentration of the HRC and the CAT on sexual violence against women 
“essentializes the woman’s experience to victimhood only, and primarily to that of sexual victim, resulting 
in the emergence of a particular kind of sexual stereotype…”194  
 
To summarize, harms on women are often misunderstood because sexual violence is considered more 
serious as compared to psychological violence. Because women are considered more emotional, women’s 
expression of pain or suffering often considered exaggerated or untrue and are thus, not taken seriously. 
This subsection argued that in the adjudication of claims of women asylum seekers, the HRC and the CAT 
must examine whether the cumulative harms they suffer from, including the psychological violence, would 
rise to the threshold of severity required to constitute torture. 
 
V. Recommendations 
 
Scholars emphasize that international human rights law must be inclusive enough “to accommodate the 
diversity of women and women’s lives without compromising its strength that lies in its appeal to universality 
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and the promotion of gender equality.”195 To do this, international human rights law must be able to fully 
recognize the harms committed against women and grant relief following such recognition. This section will 
present recommendations on how the HRC and the CAT can integrate a feminist critique into its 
adjudication to protect women asylum seekers from future harm. 
 
Recommendation 1: Increase the representation of women in human rights treaty bodies 
 
Institutionally, one important goal that needs to be pursued is to increase the representation of women in 
the HRC and the CAT, as well as in the rest of the human rights treaty bodies.196 As discussed in Section 
III, the organizational structures in the HRC and the CAT had created problems where the Committees 
have paid little attention to the question on various ways in which women’s experience of torture are different 
from men’s.  
 
Recommendation 2: Proactively consider factors not raised by women complainants  
 
In assessing whether State Parties have violated their obligations under human rights treaties, the HRC 
and the CAT, must, at all times, proactively employ intersectionality in their adjudication, regardless of 
whether or not such intersectional vulnerabilities were raised in the communication. As previously 
discussed, women asylum seekers’ claims are often subsumed within the claims of their husbands or 
relatives, that their gender-specific claims become ignored or absent in the views or decisions by the HRC 
and the CAT. Thus, while the onus of raising arguments is on the woman asylum seeker, it is important to 
acknowledge that in many cases, women asylum seekers might be incapable of effectively representing 
themselves, unable to afford a lawyer, do not understand the process for filing a communication, do not 
speak the necessary languages, and are often traumatized. Thus, the HRC and the CAT must be required 
to take these into account independently to them being raised by complainants. Also, the HRC and the CAT 
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must consider that harm affects women in different ways depending on the how they are positioned along 
the several axes of various factors such as race, religion, and immigration status. 
 
Recommendation 3: Conduct a case-by-case analysis of the factual circumstances surrounding the 
women asylum seekers’ claims, on their own merit, separate from the claims of their husbands or 
male relatives 
 
While having women asylum seekers file a joint claim with their husbands or male relatives is arguably 
more efficient, there is a danger that the gender-specific aspect of the women asylum seekers’ claims will 
be overlooked. Accordingly, I reiterate the recommendation of feminist scholars to ask ‘the woman 
question’.197 The HRC and the CAT must ask questions to ascertain sex-specific information and not 
assume that women’s experiences, given the same set of facts, are the same as those of men.198 Without 
taking into consideration the distinctive aspects of women’s experiences, appropriate services and 
programs, appropriate relief cannot be granted to women.199  
 
I agree with the recommendation of David Matas to implement a rule of automatic severance of claims, 
both at the international and domestic level, with the option of joinder to protect women asylum seekers 
who are married.200  
 
Other than assessing the claims separately from the claim of their husbands or male relatives, a fair 
assessment of women asylum seekers’ claims also requires not giving primary consideration to family 
support network as a major determining factor in deciding on the women asylum seekers’ return to their 
countries of origin. As discussed in section IV, in principle, it is not considered problematic for the HRC and 
the CAT to question whether women asylum seekers have a family who can support her in her home 
country. However, in its decisions, it is my recommendation that the HRC and the CAT must acknowledge 
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that family and community may not be able to protect women asylum seekers.  For example, in cases where 
women are at risk of female genital mutilation, the HRC and the CAT must consider the risk that family and 
community may exert pressure on them if they return to their home country.  
 
Recommendation 4: Appreciate the structural and institutional factors underpinning the 
vulnerability of women asylum seekers.  
 
More than being mere victims, women asylum seekers are forced to flee due to the structural and 
institutional forces in their countries of origin.201  Thus, the focus of the HRC and the CAT must be on the 
willingness or capability of the asylum seekers’ countries of origin to protect women from human rights 
violations as well as the societal context in which the women operate.202 Scholars propose that, in 
examining the State’s inability to protect, it is necessary to assess (1) whether a certain form of torture or 
ill-treatment is banned in the women asylum seekers’ countries of origin and (2) whether state protection is 
suffering from serious institutional deficits (i.e. whether the authorities actually examined the allegations of 
the women asylum seekers, which may be culled from country reports).203  
 
In addition to looking at a State’s willingness and capacity to protect, the HRC and the CAT must also 
assess the societal context in which women complainants exist. Instead of asking whether women asylum 
seekers have a family protection network in their countries of origin, the HRC and the CAT must ask what 
are the reasons they would need a ‘male protector’. These reasons can include “discrimination against 
women, social rejection of single women, social stigma attached to their status and social restrictions on 
women living alone.”204 This recommendation not only traces the root causes of the torture that women 
asylum seekers have faced or would face, but it also avoids attributing their suffering to women asylum 
seekers’ personal failures or limitations.205 As a result, the individual risks faced by women asylum seekers 
will not be attributed to stereotypes such as women being weak and vulnerable.  
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Recommendation 5: Assess whether mental suffering meets the standard of severity required by 
torture, even when serious bodily injury is alleged or not 
 
This recommendation will make it possible for the HRC and the CAT to be able to fully grasp the harm 
women asylum seekers actually experience.206 The HRC and the CAT must evaluate “all aspects of the 
harm in a cohesive manner”,207 including non-physical harms such as surveillance, unauthorized searches 
of places and persons, and psychological harm such as death threats.208 In legal terms, the HRC and the 
CAT must bear in mind that mental pain and suffering may constitute torture. While the HRC and the CAT 
do acknowledge the psychological harm, they do not link such harm with mental torture. As demonstrated 
in the previous section, the HRC and the CAT tend to completely ignore psychological harm when serious 
bodily injury is not present, ignoring the fact that psychological harms are typically an amalgamation of 
different types of harms.209  
 
Other than States, it is important to acknowledge the role that women’s human rights groups and other non-
governmental organizations must play in calling for a re-interpretation of the UNCAT and the ICCPR in a 
gender-sensitive manner.210 Non-governmental organizations must continue to pressure treaty bodies to 
take cognizance of the gendered nature of the violence committed against women and incorporate this into 
the implementation and enforcement of the UNCAT and the ICCPR,211 as well as into international human 
rights treaties, in general. Non-governmental organizations should take the lead in providing treaty bodies 
with gender-specific information in a systematic manner.212 
 
In summary, under the approach that this paper is proposing, there are several changes that the HRC and 
CAT should implement to ensure a gender-sensitive approach to the adjudication of women asylum 
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seeker’s claims at the HRC and the CAT.  First, there must be more women Committee members in the 
HRC and the CAT. Second, the HRC and the CAT must proactively assess the intersectional claims of 
women asylum seekers and women complainants in general. Third, the HRC and the CAT must individually 
assess the claims of women asylum seekers based on their own merit, separate from the claims of their 
husbands or male relatives, and without having the family protection network as the primary consideration 
in determining whether they would be at a risk of torture upon return to their countries of origin. This paper 
echoes the proposal of David Matas for an automatic severance of claims with the option of joinder. It 
likewise recommends for the HRC and the CAT to focus on the structural problems concerning the States 
Parties’ failure or unwillingness to respond to human rights violations committed against women. Finally, to 
fully capture the experiences of women, the HRC and CAT must consider all aspects of the harm 
experienced, including the psychological harms on women asylum seekers, to determine whether their 
severity is severe enough to constitute torture.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The decisions by the HRC and the CAT demonstrate how the human rights of women complainants, 
particularly the women asylum seekers, have been marginalized in international human rights law. Analysis 
of the views or decisions of the HRC and the CAT reveals that the legal protection offered by these treaty 
bodies to women asylum seekers remains limited, as they continue to employ a conceptual framework that 
is gender-biased. 
 
The HRC and the CAT have failed to capture the full experiences of women, i.e. they have largely failed to 
appreciate or accommodate the unique circumstances faced by women victims. A misunderstanding about 
how women experience pain and suffering differently accounts for this insensitivity to the different ways in 
which women experience pain or suffering. This is particularly evident when the HRC and the CAT decide 
the cases filed by the woman complainant and her husband jointly, resulting in the absence of an analysis 
of women’s gender-specific claim.  
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The public/private distinction has likewise served as an obstacle in the protection of the human rights of 
women asylum seekers. International human rights law is still focused on the public sphere. As a result, 
States relegate to the family protection network the duty to protect women complainants from the risk of 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. A common reason that the HRC and the CAT use to 
dismiss a claim is the presence of a family protection network. Reliance on women’s family protection in 
their country of origin effectively shifts the burden from the public sphere (State) to the private sphere 
(family). 
 
Finally, the HRC and the CAT have failed to recognize the psychological violence suffered by women 
complainants, if serious bodily injury cannot be proven. This becomes a disadvantage for women whose 
pain and suffering are often considered an exaggeration and tend to be met with disbelief. 
 
In light of these shortcomings, this paper calls for a feminist analysis of the decisions on complaints filed by 
women asylum seekers, not just with respect to torture, but in general. A feminist approach requires 
reconceptualizing the way cases filed by women complainants are viewed, in a way that would recognize 
women’s experiences using the intersectionality theory in the interpretation of rights. Moreover, the HRC 
and the CAT could more fairly adjudicate the communications filed by women asylum seekers by assessing 
whether state protection in the complainant’s country of origin is effective, instead of concluding that women 
complainants can safely return to their country because of the presence of their family members there.  
Another way to address the gendered consequences that flow from a narrow interpretation of the UNCAT 
and the ICCPR would be through an acknowledgement of psychological violence women suffer from.  
 
These discussions suggest that the HRC and the CAT must fully re-conceptualize the assessment of the 
principle of non-refoulement to fully include the experiences of women asylum seekers. While this paper 
focuses specifically on women asylum seekers as victims of torture, there is a clear spill over of both the 
theoretical observations and the practical recommendations to other issues which opens up the possibility 
of diverse application and augmentation of the ideas presented in this paper. 
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